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Abstract 
Pundits, politicians, and scholars alike have decried the dramatic 
expansion of presidential unilateral power in recent decades. Such 
brazen assertions, against which Congress and the courts have offered 
seemingly feckless resistance, have led many to decry the emergence of 
a new “imperial presidency.” From a political science perspective, 
however, perhaps the more puzzling question is the relative paucity, not 
the proliferation of unilateral actions. Why do presidents not act 
unilaterally to bring an even wider range of policies into closer align-
ment with their preferences? The dominant paradigm in political sci-
ence scholarship emphasizes Congress’s institutional weakness when 
confronting the unilateral president. It correctly notes that presidents, 
in all but the rarest of circumstances, can act with impunity, secure in 
the knowledge that legislative efforts to undo their unilateral initiatives 
will fail. However, much scholarship overlooks the critical importance 
of political costs in constraining the unilateral president, and how other 
institutions—even when they cannot legally compel the president to 
change course—can affect presidential strategic calculations by raising 
these costs. We illustrate our argument with a pair of case studies: 
President Obama’s halting unilateral policy response to the 
immigration crisis, and his abrupt about-face on unilateral action 
against the Assad regime in Syria. In these cases, we argue that 
calculations about the informal political costs of unilateral action 
affected both the timing and content of presidential policy decisions. 
When contemplating unilateral action, presidents anticipate more than 
whether they can defeat legislative efforts to overturn their unilateral 
initiatives. They also consider the political costs of acting unilaterally 
and weigh them against the benefits of doing so. Paying greater 
attention to these political constraints on unilateral action affords a 
more accurate picture of the place of the unilateral presidency within 
our separation of powers system in the contemporary era.  
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Introduction 
On July 10, 2014, the Speaker of the House, John Boehner, 
disclosed his intention to file suit against President Barack Obama for 
allegedly wanton abuse of presidential power in acting unilaterally to 
delay the employer mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act, 
fundamentally amending the law as passed absent any legislative 
authorization for the change. Echoing many congressional critics of 
unilateral presidential action before him, Speaker Boehner lamented, 
“The current president believes he has the power to make his own 
laws—at times even boasting about it. He has said that if Congress 
won’t make the laws he wants, he’ll go ahead and make them himself, 
and in the case of the employer mandate in his health care law, that’s 
exactly what he did.”1  
Bold assertions of unilateral presidential authority have been 
prominent features of the American political landscape almost since the 
Founding. The assertion and exercise of unilateral presidential power 
has been one of the hallmarks of American politics in the post-9/11 era. 
Without waiting for congressional action, President Bush determined 
that the Geneva Convention did not apply to Taliban and Al Qaeda 
prisoners and created a system of military tribunals to try those 
suspected of terrorism outside the civilian judicial system. With a top-
secret National Security Decision Directive, President Bush authorized 
the National Security Agency to eavesdrop on the electronic 
communications of American citizens without a warrant, in plain 
violation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.2 
 
1. Lauren French, GOP’s Obama Lawsuit to Focus on Employer Mandate, 
Politico (July 10, 2014, 5:40 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/201 
4/07/gop-obama-lawsuit-employer-mandate-108778.html (last updated 
July 11, 2014, 5:29 AM). 
2. Cf. Elizabeth B. Bazan & Jennifer K. Elsea, Cong. Research 
Serv., Memorandum, Presidential Authority to Conduct War-
rantless Electronic Surveillance to Gather Foreign Intel-
ligence Information (2006) (arguing that it is “unlikely that a court 
would hold that Congress . . . authorized the NSA electronic surveillance 
activities”). But see U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Legal Authority 
Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency 
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Far from providing a clear break from the unilateral bent of his 
predecessor, President Obama has followed in his footsteps and used 
the unilateral toolkit at his disposal to advance both his foreign and 
domestic policy initiatives. While a United States Senator and presiden-
tial candidate, Obama emphasized the constitutional limits on the 
president’s unilateral powers as commander in chief, stating that “[t]he 
president does not have power under the Constitution to unilaterally 
authorize a military attack in a situation that does not involve stopping 
an actual or imminent threat to the nation.”3 However, Obama would 
later change his tune. For example, in 2011, now President Obama, 
backed by the Office of Legal Counsel, argued that he possessed 
independent constitutional authority to intervene militarily in Libya 
without congressional approval because the mission was tied to a 
national interest, even if the crisis in Libya plainly did not involve an 
actual or imminent threat to the United States itself.4 Similarly, when 
contemplating military strikes against the Assad regime in Syria for its 
use of chemical weapons, the Obama administration articulated a legal 
justification for unilateral intervention because of vital national 
interests in enforcing international norms against the use of chemical 
weapons.5 In the domestic sphere, President Obama acted unilaterally 
to exempt states from the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
program’s work requirement, to instruct the Justice Department not to 
prosecute marijuana offenders in states where its use has been 
decriminalized and, as we will discuss in detail shortly, to implement 
through administrative memorandum much of the Development, Relief, 
and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, which failed to pass 
both chambers of Congress.6 
 
Described by the President (2006) for a contrasting view offered by 
the Bush Administration. 
3. David A. Fahrenthold, On Debt and Libya, It’s President Obama vs. 
Senator Obama, Washington Post, June 24, 2011 (quoting then Senator 
Obama) (internal quotation marks omitted), http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/politics/on-debt-and-libya-its-president-obama-vs-
senator-obama/2011/06/22/AGhK4AjH_story.html. 
4. Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2011), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2011 
/04/31/authority-military-use-in-libya_0.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2015). 
5. Charlie Savage, President Tests Limits of Power in Syrian Conflict, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 9, 2013, at A1, A9. 
6. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 
Security, on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to 
Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children (June 15, 2012), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-
discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 
2015). 
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Many legal scholars warn that this expansion of presidential 
unilateral power is a threat to the separation of powers. In 2014 testi-
mony before the House Judiciary Committee, Jonathan Turley argued 
that it represents “a massive gravitational shift of authority to the 
Executive Branch that threatens the stability and functionality of our 
tripartite system.” Turley acknowledges that the shift did not begin 
with Obama; “[h]owever, it has accelerated at an alarming pace under 
this administration.”7  
Empirically driven scholarship in political science confirms that re-
cent presidents have exerted their unilateral powers with unparalleled 
frequency.8 Indeed, William Howell has argued that “the ability to act 
unilaterally speaks to what is distinctively ‘modern’ about the modern 
presidency.”9 The rise of presidential assertions of unilateral power 
frequently produces jeremiads lamenting the failure of Madisonian 
checks and balances and the search for answers as to why the other 
branches have failed to defend their institutional prerogatives from such 
naked presidential power grabs.10 From a political science perspective,  
7. Enforcing the President’s Constitutional Duty to Faithfully Execute the 
Laws: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 32–
33 (2014) (written statement of Jonathan Turley, Shapiro Professor of 
Pub. Int. L., Geo. Wash. U.). See also Bruce Ackerman, The Decline 
and Fall of the American Republic (2010), and Sanford Levinson & 
Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its Design, 
94 Minn. L. Rev. 1789 (2010); Michael P. Allen, George W. Bush and 
the Nature of Executive Authority: The Role of Courts in a Time of 
Constitutional Change, 72 Brook. L. Rev. 871 (2006) for similar fears of 
extreme claims of unilateral presidential power. Further, the literature is 
replete with constitutional criticisms of individual executive orders. See, 
e.g., Michele Estrin Gilman, If at First You Don’t Succeed, Sign an 
Executive Order: President Bush and the Expansion of Charitable Choice, 
15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1103 (2007) (on charitable choice executive 
orders); Stephen Yuhan, The Imperial Presidency Strikes Back: Executive 
Order 13,233, the National Archives, and the Capture of Presidential 
History, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1570 (2004) (on access to presidential papers 
at the National Archives); Morton Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of 
Executive Power: Presidential Control of Agency Rulemaking under 
Executive Order 12,291, 80 Mich. L. Rev. 193 (1981) (on mandating 
cost-benefit analysis in rule-making). 
8. Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral 
Action, 15 J.L. Econ. & Org. 132 (1999); Terry M. Moe & William G. 
Howell, Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A Theory, 29 
Presidential Stud. Q. 850 (1999); Kenneth R. Mayer, With the 
Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential Power 
(2001); Phillip J. Cooper, By Order of the President: The Use 
and Abuse of Executive Direct Action (2002). 
9. William G. Howell, Power Without Persuasion: The Politics of 
Direct Presidential Action 13 (2003). 
10. See, e.g., Louis Fisher, Congressional Abdication on War and 
Spending (2000); see also Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, 
Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2311 (2006), on 
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however, perhaps the more puzzling question is the relative paucity, not 
the proliferation, of unilateral actions. 
The dominant scholarly paradigm is clear: presidential unilateral 
power is not absolute. Rather, the president’s capacity to affect the 
course and contours of public policy unilaterally is conditional on the 
willingness of Congress and the courts to check unilateral measures. 
However, given the institutional weaknesses and reluctance of both the 
legislature and judiciary to overturn presidential unilateral initiatives, 
presidents should be able to act with impunity in all but the rarest of 
circumstances. As a result, this Article flips the question on its head. It 
does not ask why presidents are able to achieve so much unilaterally in 
our separation of powers system, when we might logically expect the 
other branches to contest presidential aggrandizement using all 
constitutional means at their disposal. Rather, we seek insight into why 
presidents do not use the instruments in their unilateral toolkit with 
even greater frequency to address a wide range of policy priorities.  
The reason for presidential caution, we argue, is that presidents are 
far more concerned about the informal constraints on unilateral 
action—mainly the political costs of going it alone—than they are about 
being formally overturned by new legislation or a judicial decision. 
These informal constraints are all but absent from most formal models 
of unilateral politics.  
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I traces the evolution of 
political science scholarship on unilateral powers over time, from early 
accounts paying them scant attention to modern scholarship highlight-
ing these tools as a foundation of presidential power in the contem-
porary era. It then unpacks the dominant game theoretic approach 
toward understanding unilateral politics; this perspective suggests that 
presidents have a capacity to act unilaterally that is all but unchecked 
by other political actors. Part II presents our counterargument that by 
failing to account for public opinion and informal political costs, the 
dominant approach seriously overestimates the president’s power to 
achieve his policy goals unilaterally and underestimates the capacity of 
Congress and the courts to constrain and even deter unilateral action. 
Parts III and IV illustrate our argument through a pair of case studies: 
an examination of President Obama’s halting unilateral policy response 
to the immigration crisis, and an assessment of President Obama’s 
abrupt about-face on unilateral action against the Assad regime in 
Syria. 
I. Formal Theory and Presidential Unilateral Power 
Assertions of presidential unilateral power emerged almost immed-
iately under our constitutional system. President Washington famously 
 
the role of partisanship in upsetting the checks and balances described in 
Federalist 51. 
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issued his Proclamation of Neutrality in 1793 and, in so doing, claimed 
for the executive the right to define the nation’s foreign policy posture 
until Congress exercised its power to declare war. President Jefferson 
negotiated the Louisiana Purchase without any prior congressional 
approval. President Lincoln took many steps to put the Union on a war 
footing in 1861 while Congress was not in session, including an 
attempted resupply of Fort Sumter, the institution of a naval blockade 
against confederate ports, and the suspension of the writ of habeas 
corpus. In 1863 Lincoln issued perhaps the most sweeping unilateral 
directive of all time, the Emancipation Proclamation. At the turn of 
the twentieth century, in articulating his stewardship theory of 
presidential power, President Theodore Roosevelt went perhaps further 
still in declaring an undefined residuum of presidential power to act in 
the national interest. In contrast to a constrictive view of presidential 
power limiting the president’s sphere of action to cases where he was 
acting pursuant to some specific authorization, Roosevelt brazenly 
made the case for an expansive reading of presidential power. 
My belief was that it was not only his right but his duty to do 
anything that the needs of the nation demanded unless such 
action was forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws. Under 
this interpretation of executive power, I did and caused to be 
done many things not previously done by the President and the 
heads of the departments. I did not usurp power, but I did greatly 
broaden the use of executive power.11 
In office, Roosevelt put this theory into practice, acting aggressively to 
project American power and to pursue American economic interests, be 
they in Santo Domingo, Panama, or across the Pacific.12  
Courts have grappled with questions of the constitutionality of 
unilateral presidential actions almost since the Founding. For example, 
in the 1804 case Little v. Barreme,13 Chief Justice Marshall struck down 
an order by President John Adams issued during the quasi-war with 
France authorizing American naval vessels to seize ships sailing to and 
from French ports. Marshall argued that had Adams acted alone, the 
order would have been constitutional. However, because Congress had 
explicitly authorized the seizure only of ships sailing to French ports 
(and the Barreme was sailing from a French port), the order was 
unconstitutional. Additional nineteenth-century cases involved 
challenges to specific presidential unilateral actions, such as Ex Parte 
 
11. Theodore Roosevelt, Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography 
357 (1922). 
12. See generally Edmund Morris, Theodore Rex (2001) (detailing Roos-
evelt’s time as president, including his foreign policy initiatives in 
Panama). 
13. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804). 
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Merriman14 and Lincoln’s unilateral suspension of the writ of habeas 
corpus. However, in the 1930s, the Supreme Court issued a series of 
rulings putting presidential unilateral powers on a firmer legal footing. 
Two cases, United States v. Curtiss-Wright15 and United States v. 
Pink,16 established the president’s power to enter the United States into 
international agreements and that these agreements have the same legal 
status as treaties. A third case, United States v. Belmont,17 recognized 
the president’s power to issue executive orders and held that those 
orders have the force of federal law, including preeminence over state 
law.18 
Despite the growing prominence of unilateral powers, for decades 
they were given short shrift by political science scholarship. This is true 
of the more legalistic studies that dominated presidency studies during 
the early and mid-twentieth century.19 For example, Edward Corwin’s 
The President, Office and Power never used the word “unilateral.” To 
be sure, such powers are occasionally discussed; for example, Corwin 
assessed the constitutionality of executive agencies created by Franklin 
D. Roosevelt via executive order pursuant to his authority as 
commander in chief. However, these powers were far from a point of 
emphasis.20 This characterization is perhaps even truer following the 
publication of Richard Neustadt’s Presidential Power in 1960 and the 
behavioral revolution in presidency studies that it precipitated. 
Neustadt argued that the president’s formal powers were wholly 
insufficient to the demands for energetic leadership placed upon the 
office in the post–World War II era. Falling back on the limited, 
unreliable, and often ineffective or counterproductive powers of 
“command” was a hallmark of weak presidents. Instead, power was 
largely a function of an individual president’s skill and will in building 
and maintaining a strong professional reputation and prestige among 
the public and then leveraging that capital to persuade other actors, 
particularly legislators but also members of the executive branch, to 
pursue presidential policies.  
The explicit de-emphasis in presidential scholarship on unilateral 
action began to change near the turn of the new millennium. A new 
wave of scholarship demonstrated that presidents can wield tremendous 
 
14. 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861). 
15.  299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
16.  315 U.S. 203 (1942). 
17. 301 U.S. 324 (1937). 
18. Howell, supra note 9, at 20–21; see also Glendon A. Schubert Jr., 
The Presidency in the Courts (1957). 
19. E.g., Edward S. Corwin, The President, Office and Powers, 
1787–1957: History and Analysis of Practice and Opinion (1957); 
Clinton Rossiter, The American Presidency (2nd ed. 1960). 
20. See Corwin, supra note 19, at 242–43. 
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power when acting unilaterally through an array of tools, including 
executive orders, executive agreements, memoranda, proclamations, 
and national security decision directives.21 This new line of research 
presented illustrative case studies of presidents effecting major policy 
changes unilaterally in policy domains as diverse as civil rights to 
foreign policy. Moreover, empirical assessments showed that the use of 
such unilateral tools has increased in recent decades.22 
How then are we to understand the forces driving when presidents 
employ unilateral initiatives and when they do not? William Howell’s 
unilateral politics model remains perhaps the dominant approach in the 
political science literature.23 Howell’s model builds off Keith Krehbiel’s 
pivotal politics model of lawmaking.24 For decades, scholars have used 
a simple median voter model as a heuristic to help make sense of 
legislative behavior. This perspective posits that the median voter is 
the dominant player in a legislature.25 Any policy that would make the 
median voter happier than the status quo (or more formally yield the 
median voter more utility) is enacted into law.26 By contrast, proposals 
that the median voter does not prefer to the status quo fail when 
brought to a vote on the floor.27 
Krehbiel’s insight was that this median voter framework does not 
accurately describe the American legislative system, which has multiple 
super-majoritarian requirements. Specifically, in the Senate, a minority 
can filibuster a bill supported by the majority and prevent it from 
receiving a final up or down vote. As a result, sixty votes are required 
to secure passage of most major legislative initiatives in the Senate. 
Furthermore, once passed by both chambers of Congress, a bill still 
must be signed by the president to become law. If a bill moves policy 
away from the president’s preferences, he will veto it. In this case, a 
two-thirds majority is needed to overturn the presidential veto. Hence, 
the key players in the American context are what Krehbiel terms the 
filibuster pivot and the veto pivot—the legislators who are key in 
 
21. See Phillip J. Cooper, Power Tools for an Effective and Responsible 
Presidency, 29 Admin. & Soc’y 529 (1997); Kenneth R. Mayer, Executive 
Orders and Presidential Power, 61 J. Pol. 445 (1999); Moe & Howell, 
Presidential Power, supra note 8. 
22. For example, while the total number of executive orders has decreased 
considerably since the 1940s, Howell shows that the number of significant 
executive orders has steadily increased over time. Howell, supra note 9, 
at 84–85. 
23. Id. 
24. See Keith Krehbiel, Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Law-
making (1998). 
25.  Id. 
26.  Id. 
27. Id. 
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determining whether a bill can secure sixty votes to stop a filibuster or 
a two-thirds vote to override a presidential veto.28 
Perhaps the most important result of Krehbiel’s model is that many 
policies are “gridlocked”—that is, no bill that would change the status 
quo can be passed and signed by the president. The ideological space 
between the filibuster and the veto pivots is christened the “gridlock 
interval”; status quo policies within this ideological space cannot be 
changed by normal legislative procedures. Rather, policy change 
happens when an exogenous shock, such as a major electoral swing, 
shifts the ideological locations of the key players, making policy change 
again possible. This theory of lawmaking offers keen insight into our 
contemporary institutional malaise. Partisan polarization widens the 
gridlock interval by moving the pivotal players further to the ideological 
extremes. This, in turn, makes legislative action all but impossible for 
a growing number of issue areas. 
Howell embraces the basic framework of the pivotal politics model 
but with one particularly important modification. Presidents can do 
more than veto legislation. Presidents can also be first-movers in the 
American system by acting unilaterally. Once making this adjustment, 
even the basic model yields a surprising result: the very same 
institutional setup that makes it so difficult for presidents to achieve 
their policy priorities legislatively gives them tremendous advantages 
when acting unilaterally.29 Indeed, the model suggests that presidents 
can move any status quo policy lodged within the gridlock interval 
closer to their preferences, provided that the new policy remains within 
that interval, secure in the knowledge that Congress will not be able to 
undo legislatively what the president has changed unilaterally.  
As a result, formal theories of unilateral politics predict that 
presidents should be able to act unilaterally with little risk of being 
overturned by Congress on a wide range of issues. Moreover, since all 
they need to ensure is that their veto of any initiative by Congress to 
restore the status quo is sustained, presidents are even more empowered 
in an era of intense partisan polarization.30 For example, for almost any 
conceivable action he would desire to take unilaterally, President 
Obama should be able to recruit thirty-four liberal Democrats in the 
Senate who would support such a policy shift. As Neal Katyal describes  
28. To simplify matters, Krehbiel posits a unicameral legislature in explicat-
ing his theory. Id. 
29. Howell goes on to add additional features, such as the discretion that the 
judiciary will allow presidents to exercise to the model. See Howell, 
supra note 9, at 30–31. However, the basic features and conclusions that 
presidents enjoy wide latitude to act unilaterally remain.  
30. See Christopher J. Deering & Forrest Maltzman, The Politics of Executive 
Orders: Legislative Constraints on Presidential Power, 52 Pol. Res. Q. 
767, 771 (1999), for a similar emphasis on the veto override and 
presidential anticipation thereof. 
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it, the veto has become a tool that can “entrench presidential decrees,” 
all but completely undermining legislative checks on presidential 
assertions of unilateral power.31  
Of course, formal models are simplifications of reality. Are the 
congressional checks on the unilateral president stronger than such 
models propose? Howell argues no.32 In fact, Congress may be even 
weaker than the unilateral politics model predicts. The formal model 
assumes that Congress will pass and override a presidential veto on any 
bill amending policy changed by an executive order that is closer to the 
veto pivot’s preferences than the unilaterally created policy. However, 
in reality the task for legislators is not so simple. Congress as an 
institution is plagued by a collective action dilemma when it tries to 
rally to defend its institutional prerogatives. Moreover, even when 
acting to constrain the president is in enough members’ personal and 
political as well as collective institutional interests, it is exceedingly 
difficult to build and maintain large coalitions throughout a legislative 
process that is riddled with transaction costs.33 As a result, the modern 
congressional constraint on presidential unilateral action may be even 
weaker than suggested by the formal model. These institutional 
weaknesses of Congress may render it unable to challenge successfully 
unilateral actions, even when a super-majority of members would prefer 
legislation to overturn a presidential order and restore a status quo 
more pleasing to most legislators.  
II. The Political Costs of Unilateral Action 
The dominant theoretical understanding of unilateral politics 
suggests that presidents have the capacity to act with veritable im-
punity to shift unilaterally a myriad of policies closer to their prefer-
ences, secure in the knowledge that Congress will only in the rarest of 
cases be able to overturn their actions legislatively. Similarly, empirical 
evidence suggests that the courts exercise at best a weak constraint on 
the use of unilateral power. For example, between 1942 and 1998, the  
31. Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s 
Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 Yale L.J. 2314, 2320 (2006); 
see also Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and 
the Separation of Powers, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 411 (2012); Neal Devins, 
Presidential Unilateralism and Political Polarization: Why Today’s 
Congress Lacks the Will and the Way to Stop Presidential Initiatives, 45 
Willamette L. Rev. 395 (2009) (on Congress’s institutional weakness 
vis-à-vis the executive). 
32. Howell, supra note 9, at 101. 
33. See Terry M. Moe, The Presidency and the Bureaucracy: The Presidential 
Advantage, in The Presidency and the Political System 437 
(Michael Nelson ed., 1998) (on collective action dilemmas); Terry M. Moe 
& Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, 57 L. & 
Contemp. Probs. 1 (1994) (on transaction costs). 
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federal courts heard only eighty-three cases challenging the legality of 
executive orders. Moreover, in 83 percent of those cases, the president’s 
order was upheld.34 Thus, presidents act unilaterally, secure in the 
knowledge that the probability of a legal challenge ever being heard in 
federal court is quite low; and if the judiciary does hear a case, the 
probability of the order being upheld is quite high.35 
Consistent with scholarship demonstrating the severe limitations 
hindering the capacity of Congress and the courts to check assertions 
of unilateral presidential power, contemporary presidents have indeed 
used their unilateral toolkit to materially affect the course and content 
of public policy across a range of issues. Indeed, the use of unilateral 
power has given rise to jeremiads from both pundits and scholars alike 
that we are witnessing the return of the “imperial presidency.”36 
However, what is perhaps more surprising is the number of times and 
issue areas in which presidents have refrained from acting unilaterally 
to move policy closer to their preferences when they find themselves 
blocked legislatively. From our perspective, what is puzzling is not the 
frequency with which presidents act unilaterally but the relative 
paucity with which they do so.37 Identifying and measuring trends in 
the number of “significant” executive orders over time is a difficult 
enterprise.38 Like laws, most executive orders, as well as many other 
unilateral directives, have relatively little tangible influence on politics 
and policy. While presidents have undeniably achieved major policy 
victories through unilateral action, the number of major unilateral 
actions in a given year is usually relatively modest. Given their 
 
34. Howell, supra note 9, at 153–55. 
35. To be sure, there are notable exceptions to this general rule, such as the 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld decision. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to Practice, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 65 
(2006). 
36. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Takeover: The Return of the Imperial 
Presidency and the Subversion of American Democracy (2007); 
Andrew Rudalevige, The New Imperial Presidency: Renewing 
Presidential Power after Watergate (2005). See Arthur M. 
Schlesinger Jr., The Imperial Presidency (1973), for the original 
articulation of the emergence of an imperial presidency during the 
Johnson and Nixon administrations. 
37. This is analogous to a paradigm shift in electoral studies, which instead 
of decrying the influence of the billions of dollars spent on American 
election campaigns asks instead, given the high stakes, “why is there so 
little money in U.S. politics?” See Gordon Tullock, The Purchase of 
Politicians, 10 W. Econ. J. 354–55 (1972); Stephen Ansolabehere, John 
M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder Jr., Why Is There So Little Money 
in U.S. Politics?, 17 J. Econ. Persps. 105 (2003). 
38. See Kenneth R. Mayer & Kevin Price, Unilateral Presidential Powers: 
Significant Executive Orders, 1949–99, 32 Presidential Stud. Q. 367, 
79 (2002). 
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institutional advantages, why do presidents not act unilaterally more 
aggressively? 
A small but growing number of studies has pushed back against the 
dominant theoretical paradigm emphasizing the president’s great 
latitutde to act unilaterally. The most prominent critique concerns 
difficulties in bureaucratic implementation. Presidents may well have 
the power to issue orders; however, that does not necessarily ensure 
that other actors in the executive branch will automatically comply and 
implement orders in strict accordance with presidential preferences. 
Emphasizing the principal-agent problems that hinder presidential 
efforts to control the bureaucracy, Matthew Dickinson argues that 
rather than replacing bargaining, unilateral action represents “a change 
in where, and with whom bargaining takes place.” Moreover, Dickinson 
contends that “the transaction costs of unilateral action—haggling over 
the details of presidential directives, estimating bureaucrats’ 
preferences, attracting interest-group and public support, and ensuring 
bureaucratic compliance—often rival the costs of acting through 
Congress.”39 
Here, we take a different tack and emphasize the informal political 
costs of unilateral action. Specifically, we argue that presidents consider 
more than just whether Congress or the courts will act affirmatively to 
overturn a unilateral presidential order. Rather, presidents consider the 
longer-term political costs that unilateral action may entail. These 
political costs can take many forms, two of which are particularly 
important. First, when presidents act unilaterally, they may burn 
bridges with members of Congress opposed to the action on political, 
ideological, or even constitutional grounds. To be sure, in almost all 
circumstances, presidents will be able to carry the day and beat back 
any legislative effort to undo what they have done unilaterally. 
However, the ill will so generated on Capitol Hill may prove politically 
costly the next time the president’s policy wishes require action that 
only Congress can take. For example, despite being a rather blunt 
instrument, Congress retains the power of the purse and therefore, 
ultimately, the power to support or de-fund most policies that 
presidents begin unilaterally.40 This echoes Neustadt’s moral from the 
 
39. Matthew J. Dickinson, The Politics of Persuasion: A Bargaining Model 
of Presidential Power, in Presidential Leadership: The Vortex of 
Power 277, 296 (Bert A. Rockman & Richard W. Waterman eds., 2008). 
See Joshua Kennedy, “Do This! Do That!” And Nothing Will Happen: 
Executive Orders and Bureaucratic Responsiveness, 43 Am. Pol. Res. 
59 (2015), for empirical evidence of agency nonresponsiveness to unilateral 
orders. See also Andrew Rudalevige, Executive Orders and Presidential 
Unilateralism, 42 Presidential Stud. Q. 138 (2012). 
40. See Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 Yale L.J. 1343 (1988); 
Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Limited War and the Constitution: 
Iraq and the Crisis of Presidential Legality, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 447 
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“three cases of command”—Truman’s firing of General Douglas 
MacArthur and seizure of the steel mills during the Korean War, and 
Eisenhower federalizing the Arkansas National Guard to integrate 
Central High School. In each case, the president succeeded in achieving 
his immediate policy objective. Yet, in each case, Neustadt argues the 
victory was a pyrrhic one, coming at a high political cost. Truman’s 
actions, in particular, only intensified ongoing battles with Congress on 
both the foreign and domestic fronts and likely hindered Truman’s 
efforts to extract concessions from Congress on other key elements of 
his legislative agenda.41 
A second constraining force is public opinion. In addition to 
anticipating the reaction of Congress, presidents also anticipate the 
reaction of the American people to a bold assertion of presidential 
unilateral power.42 Unilateral action may provide a potent mechanism 
for the president to carry the day and move policy closer to his ideal 
preferences on a specific issue. However, if it erodes his overall support 
among the general public, it could come at a significant long-term cost 
in terms of future policy priorities that overwhelm any short-term 
policy gain. Decades of scholarship have shown that presidential 
approval is a vitally important resource for presidents as they pursue 
their policy agendas in Congress.43 Stripped of public support and the 
political pressure it generates, presidents with low approval ratings face 
long odds in advancing their programmatic agendas in Washington.  
 
(2011), on the limitations of congressional appropriations power as an 
instrument of separation of powers politics. 
41. “Truman’s dismissal of MacArthur involved other costs as well, charged 
against other policy objectives. These ‘indirect costs’ are hard to isolate 
because causation is no single-track affair, but certainly they were not 
inconsiderable. Among others, it is possible that Truman’s inability to 
make his case with Congress, Court and public in the steel crisis of 1952 
resulted from exhaustion of his credit, so to speak, in the MacArthur 
battle a year earlier.” Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power 
and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from 
Roosevelt to Reagan 27–28 (1990). 
42. See, e.g., William Howell & Douglas Kriner, Power without Persuasion: 
Identifying Executive Influence, in Presidential Leadership, supra 
note 39, at 129–33, on the role of public opinion in prompting President 
George W. Bush to abandon his plan to unilaterally ease regulator limits 
on the allowable level of arsenic in water. 
43. See, e.g., Douglas Rivers & Nancy L. Rose, Passing the President’s 
Program: Public Opinion and Presidential Influence in Congress, 29 Am. 
J. Pol. Sci. 183 (1985); Brandice Canes-Wrone & Scott de Marchi, 
Presidential Approval and Legislative Success, 64 J. Pol. 491 (2002); 
Bryan W. Marshall & Brandon C. Prins, Strategic Position Taking and 
Presidential Influence in Congress, 32 Legis. Stud. Q. 257 (2007); 
Matthew N. Beckmann, Pushing the Agenda: Presidential 
Leadership in U.S. Lawmaking, 1953–2004 (2010). 
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How does the public respond to bold assertions of unilateral power? 
Relevant polling data are rather scarce; however, the extant evidence, 
despite its limitations, suggests that the public holds deep reservations 
about broad assertions of unilateral presidential power.44 For example, 
in January 2014 an ABC News/Washington Post poll revealed an 
evenly divided public on the idea of unilateral action in the abstract. 
The question began, “Presidents have the power in some cases to bypass 
Congress and take action by executive order to accomplish their 
administration’s goals.” Respondents were then asked whether they 
supported or opposed this approach. Just more than 40 percent strongly 
or somewhat supported presidents pursuing their policy goals via 
executive order; 46 percent opposed a unilateral leadership approach, 
with 25 percent strongly opposing it.45 Polling data on more concrete 
issues often reveal even greater public concern with a unilateral 
approach. For example, a July 2014 poll referencing President Obama’s 
unilateral changes to the ACA, which prompted the House lawsuit with 
which this Article began, asked Americans, “Do you think President 
(Barack) Obama exceeded his authority under the Constitution when 
he changed the health care law on his own by executive order?” A 
substantial majority, 58 percent, said yes, the president had exceeded 
his constitutional authority. Only 37 percent replied that no, he had 
not done so.46  
Finally, polls that explicitly measure public support for policy 
action through presidential unilateral initiatives versus through the 
legislative process show a strong preference for the latter. For example, 
a December 2001 poll reveals a widespread public preference for joint 
presidential-congressional action—even in the immediate aftermath of 
9/11 when President George W. Bush enjoyed the highest approval 
ratings ever recorded. After a series of questions measuring popular 
support for a number of potential changes to criminal procedures after 
 
44. See Andrew Reeves & Jon Rogowski, Mass Attitudes Toward Executive 
Power (working paper) (presented at the 2014 Annual Meeting of the Am. 
Pol. Sci. Ass’n, Washington, D.C.), for one of the only political science 
analyses of public attitudes toward unilateral power. 
45. Survey, Presidents have the power in some cases to bypass Congress and 
take action by executive order to accomplish their administration’s goals. 
Is this approach something you . . . ?, ABC News/Washington Post 
(Jan. 27, 2014), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
page/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2014/01/26/National-Politics/Polling/ 
question_13006.xml?uuid=Rv4tgIZHEeOv-BkfjReDJQ. [USABCWP.01 
2614.R12]. 
46. Survey, Do you think President (Barack) Obama exceeded his authority 
under the Constitution when he changed the health care law on his own 
by executive order?, Fox News (July 23, 2014), available at http:// 
www.foxnews.com/politics/interactive/2014/07/23/fox-news-poll-voters-
say-putin-has-upper-hand-in-ukraine-obama-exceeded/. [USCBSNYT.12 
1101.R46]. 
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9/11, a CBS/New York Times poll asked, “Do you think changes to 
the way in which government agencies seek, investigate and prosecute 
suspected criminals should be decided by the President alone through 
an executive order, or through legislation enacted by the Congress and 
approved by the President?” A full 82 percent said that such changes 
should be made by both branches through the legislative process. Only 
12 percent supported the president acting alone through executive 
order.47 Thus, presidents have good reason to worry that acting 
unilaterally on a high-profile issue or too frequently may trigger a public 
backlash that will undermine their efforts to achieve other policy 
priorities. Presidents face strong incentives to be strategic in their use 
of unilateral powers. 
Moreover, other institutions, particularly Congress, may play an 
important role—even when presidents know that efforts to overturn an 
executive action will fail—by engaging in the political debate and 
mobilizing public pressure against the president should he act unilater-
ally contra congressional preferences. Decades of political science scho-
larship have demonstrated that the public lacks systematic knowledge 
of politics and therefore relies heavily on heuristics when forming their 
political judgments.48 Political elites thus become key cue-givers who 
help inform and shape public opinion.49 Finally, citizens acquire most 
of their knowledge about politics from the mass media. Scholars have 
long noted that the media depend on official Washington sources for 
information. However, a robust literature in political communications 
goes further and argues that the media tend “to ‘index’ the range of 
voices and viewpoints in both news and editorials according to the 
range of views expressed in mainstream government debate about a 
 
47. Survey, Do you think changes to the way in which government agencies 
seek, investigate and prosecute suspected criminals should be decided by 
the President alone through an executive order, or through legislation 
enacted by the Congress and approved by the President?, CBS 
News/N.Y. Times (Dec. 2001), available at http://presdata.tamu.edu/ 
ArchiveData/cbs01.html (download DEC01A.DDL using DDLTOX to 
open the dataset in SAS, SPSS, or Stata). [USCBSNYT.121101.R46]. 
48. Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy 
(1950); Michael X. Delli Carpini & Scott Keeter, What Amer-
icans Know about Politics and Why It Matters (1996); Walter 
Lippmann, Public Opinion (1922). 
49. Richard A. Brody, Assessing the President (1991); Adam J. 
Berinsky, In Time of War: Understanding American Public 
Opinion from World War II to Iraq (2009); John R. Zaller, The 
Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (1992); Douglas Kriner & 
Francis Shen, Responding to War on Capitol Hill: Battlefield Casualties, 
Congressional Response, and Public Support for the War in Iraq, 58 Am. 
J. Pol. Sci. 157 (2014). 
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given topic.”50 When other political actors, particularly members of 
Congress, object and criticize presidential actions in the public sphere, 
they are all but assured of receiving considerable media coverage, and 
they are well-positioned to influence public opinion against the 
executive branch.51 
In essence, we argue that while the statutory and legal constraints 
on presidential unilateral power are weak, the political constraints are 
quite robust.52 Unilateral actions that could provoke public ire and 
erode the president’s political capital, thereby undermining later efforts 
to pursue other aspects of the president’s programmatic agenda, may 
fail a simple cost-benefit calculation. The informal political costs of 
acting—even when Congress and the courts are almost certainly 
unwilling or unable to strike down the action—may outweigh the policy 
benefits of acting unilaterally. These political costs, which are not 
accounted for in most extant models of unilateral politics, are tangible 
and substantial; indeed, they may explain why presidents fail to act 
unilaterally as aggressively and on as many issues across the gamut of 
policy as formal models suggest they should.  
III. Case Study: Obama and Immigration 
As an initial illustration of his argument that presidential power is 
primarily achieved through informal persuasion, Richard Neustadt 
paradoxically began with what he labeled “three cases of command.”53 
These rare instances of presidential success through command were, 
Neustadt argued, the exceptions that prove the rule; more importantly, 
each “victory” came at considerable political cost. As a result, Neustadt 
argued, these cases show that presidents are better able to exert lasting 
influence in Washington through bargaining and other informal means. 
Here we embrace a similar strategy. We first illustrate our argument 
about the importance of informal political constraints on unilateral  
50. W. Lance Bennett, Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the 
United States, 40 J. Comm. 103, 106 (1990). See also Robert M. 
Entman, Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, 
and U.S. Foreign Policy (2004); Jonathan Mermin, Debating War 
and Peace: Media Coverage of U.S. Intervention in the Post-
Vietnam Era (1999). 
51. See David R. Mayhew, America’s Congress: Actions in the Public 
Sphere, James Madison Through Newt Gingrich 1–28 (2000), on 
the influence members of Congress can exert by engaging in policy debates 
in the public sphere. 
52. Our argument is similar to that of Posner and Vermeule. Eric A. Posner 
& Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the 
Madisonian Republic (2010); see also Jack Goldsmith, Power and 
Constraint: The Accountable Presidency after 9/11 (2012) 
(arguing that informal constraints have largely replaced formal legislative 
and judicial checks on the commander in chief since 9/11). 
53. Neustadt, supra note 41. 
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executive action by examining the area where Obama has had the most 
dramatic impact by acting unilaterally: immigration. Even in this case, 
routinely cited as the most brazen example of President Obama 
wielding unbridled unilateral executive authority, we argue that a close 
read of the evidence suggests that President Obama did more than 
simply move policy as close to his ideal preference as possible while still 
ensuring that his allies in Congress could sustain a presidential veto. 
Rather, President Obama, like all presidents, engaged in a much more 
complex cost-benefit calculation. Indeed, we argue that informal 
political constraints significantly influenced both the timing and the 
content of President Obama’s two most important executive actions in 
this sphere.  
As the midterm elections of 2014 approached, Obama rallied voters 
in Bridgeport, Connecticut, to support Governor Dan Malloy. A not-
unfamiliar experience for him at this point in his trip along the East 
Coast, protesters interrupted with shouts demanding changes to the 
nation’s immigration policy. Despite a recent string of primarily 
Republican opposition to legislative actions on the issue, Obama 
seemed unable to quell the protesters with claims that “Republicans 
are blocking immigration reform.”54 Instead, the protesters called for 
unilateral action from the president. Maria Praeli, a member of the 
immigration protest group United We Dream said that “[o]ur commun-
ity expects President Obama to be broad in using his executive 
authority to provide deportation relief to millions of people from our 
community, including parents of dreamers, and we’re here to hold him 
accountable to his promise.”55 Moreover, the timing of the protests 
suggests that citizens were unwilling to wait until after the election and 
instead were calling for the president to deliver on his long-promised 
executive action to liberalize immigration policy immediately.  
The case of immigration provides a lens through which to view the 
precarious position of presidents in pursuing unilateral action on 
domestic policy. It is a nearly ideal example in so far as it has been a 
constant consideration since the birth of the country, is both simple 
and salient enough for the public to grasp and demand policy change, 
and, finally, pits the president in direct conflict with Congress via the 
expressed powers in the Constitution. Here we will concentrate on the 
first six years of the Obama presidency’s experience with immigration 
reform, though it is helpful to begin with a brief mention of the history 
and origins of executive action in immigration policy in the U.S.  
The 4th clause of Article I, section 8 of the Constitution gives 
Congress the power “to establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization.” 
 
54. Dave Boyer, Immigration Hecklers Interrupt Obama at Connecticut 
Campaign Rally, Wash. Times, Nov. 2, 2014, http://www.washington 
times.com/news/2014/nov/2/immigration-hecklers-interrupt-obama-con 
necticut-c/?page=all. 
55. Id.  
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Presidents, however, have played a key role in changing and modifying 
immigration laws and, even more so, their applications through 
unilateral action. While the president is constitutionally mandated to 
faithfully execute the laws enacted by Congress, presidents have some 
discretion in how they instruct agents of the executive branch to go 
about enforcing the laws and absolute discretion in the case of criminal 
laws against private individuals.56 A key feature of separation of powers 
is that the president is granted autonomy to protect individual 
liberties,57 which is legalistically expressed under “prosecutorial 
discretion,” such that the executive branch may choose whether to 
“seek charges against violators of a federal law or to pardon violators 
of a federal law.”58 These executive powers have been employed to 
protect various immigrant communities throughout history, and the 
Court has repeatedly affirmed such agency discretion.59 In Arizona v. 
United States,60 for example, the Court explained that the executive 
branch was dominant on immigration law because of its power over 
enforcement: “A principal feature of the removal system is the broad 
discretion exercised by immigration officials. Federal officials, as an 
initial matter, must decide whether it makes sense to pursue removal 
at all.”61  
President Eisenhower, for example, took advantage of executive 
powers in the face of broad immigration laws seemingly out of step with 
the times. Following World War II and Korea, Eisenhower recognized 
that a number of American citizens, many members of the armed forces 
who had served overseas, had adopted foreign-born children but, due 
to quotas under the McCarran-Walter Act and Refugee Relief Act, 
could not bring their children back with them. In a public statement 
announcing this exception, Eisenhower also addressed the novelty of 
this power:  
I requested the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to 
determine whether it is possible to alleviate this problem within 
 
56. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. See Charles Gordon, Stephen Yale-Loehr, 
& Ronald Y. Wada, 1-3 Immigration Law and Procedure § 3.14 
(2014), available at http://www.lexis.com, for a description of this in 
terms of immigration policy. 
57. In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255, 264 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
58. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (Executive Power Clause); U.S. Const. 
art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (Oath of Office Clause); U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 
(Pardon Clause); U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 (Take Care Clause). See also 
U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (Bill of Attainder Clause). 
59. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). See also Confiscation Cases, 
74 U.S. 454, 457 (1868).  
60. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
61. Id. at 2499. 
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the framework of existing law. The Secretary of State and the 
Attorney General have just reported to me that this can be done. 
Provision for bringing these orphans to our country, pending 
action by Congress to amend the law, will be put into effect 
immediately.62  
Eisenhower would later also grant parole to 31,915 Hungarians after a 
failed uprising against the Soviets and to Cubans seeking asylum during 
and after the Cuban Revolution, a policy that would be expanded by 
Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. Indeed, every president since 
Eisenhower has used unilateral action to grant temporary immigration 
relief to one population or another.63  
Most notably, given its similarity to Obama’s recent actions, 
President George H.W. Bush had his Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) Commissioner Gene McNary issue a “Family Fairness” 
policy in 1990. The policy addressed a practical loophole in the Immi-
gration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). Signed into law by President 
Reagan in 1986, the law, while making it illegal to hire immigrants 
without legal status and requiring employers to attest to their 
employees’ status, legalized groups of immigrants doing seasonal 
agricultural work and those who arrived before 1982 if they could pay 
various fines and demonstrate minimal knowledge of U.S. history and 
government. However, this left spouses and children of aliens legalized 
through the IRCA in jeopardy. Bush’s “Family Fairness” policy, which 
affected approximately 1.5 million immigrants, discarded the “compel-
ling or humanitarian factors” requirement, granted relief from 
deportation, and authorized affected persons to apply for employment  
62. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Statement by the President Concerning the Entry 
Into the United States of Adopted Foreign-Born Orphans (Oct. 26, 1956) 
(transcript available at The American Presidency Project, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10677). 
63. See Executive Grants of Temporary Immigration Relief, 1956–Present, 
Immigration Policy Center (Oct. 2, 2014) http://immigration 
policy.org/just-facts/executive-grants-temporary-immigration-relief-
1956-present; Marshall Fitz, What the President Can Do on Immigration 
If Congress Fails to Act, Ctr. for Am. Progress (July 1, 2014), 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/report/2014/07/ 
01/93042/what-the-president-can-do-on-immigration-if-congress-fails-to-
act/; Andorra Bruno, Todd Garvey, Kate Manuel & Ruthe Ellen Wasem, 
Cong. Research Serv., Memorandum, Analysis of June 15, 2012 
DHS Memorandum, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with 
Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as 
Children (2012), available at http://edsource.org// 
wp-content/uploads/Deferred-Action-Congressional-Research-Service-
Report.pdf; Arthur C. Helton, Foreign Language Info. Serv., 
Immigration Parole Power: Toward Flexible Responses to Migration 
Emergencies, 71 Interpreter Releases 1637 (Dec. 12, 1994); John W. 
Guendelsberger, Family Fairness: A Status Report, in 15 In Defense of 
the Alien 45 (Ctr. for Migration Studs. 1992). 
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permits for family members.64 These past precedents suggest that the 
actions of the Obama administration, while made up of its own 
dynamics, have been anything but unusual.  
In 2008, Barack Obama campaigned on the need for significant 
reform to the nation’s broken immigration system. With the Latino 
vote an ever-expanding consideration in campaigns and with some of 
the biggest supporters of immigration reform hailing from his home 
state of Illinois (e.g., Congressman Luis Gutierrez and Senator Richard 
Durbin), Obama promised to overhaul immigration policy by 
supporting a comprehensive immigration reform bill in his first year, 
specifically one that would secure the border, dissuade employers from 
hiring unlawful immigrants, and offer a pathway to citizenship for 
undocumented immigrants in good standing.65 The main legislative 
vehicle became the “Development, Relief, and Education for Alien 
Minors Act” (S. 1291), or DREAM Act, which had seen a number of 
incarnations in various bills since originally proposed in Representative 
Gutierrez’s “Immigrant Children’s Educational Advancement and 
Dropout Prevention Act of 2001” (H.R. 1582).66  
 
64. Bruno et al., supra note 63. 
65. Lukas Pleva, No Big Push in First Year, Politfact.com (Aug. 13, 
2010), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/promises/obameter/pro 
mise/525/introduce-comprehensive-immigration-bill-first-yea/. 
66. See DREAM Act, S. 1545, 108th Cong. (2003); DREAM Act of 2005, S. 
2075, 109th Cong. (2005); DREAM Act of 2007, S. 774, 110th Cong. 
(2007); DREAM Act of 2007, S. 2205, 110th Cong. (2007); Student 
Adjustment Act of 2003, H.R. 1684, 108th Cong. (2003); American Dream 
Act, H.R. 5131, 109th Cong. (2006); American Dream Act, H.R. 1275, 
110th Cong. (2007). The focus of the bill was to provide a path for 
immigrant students with unlawful status who had resided in the U.S. for 
five years to avoid deportation and apply for permanent residency, 
provided they met various age, educational, and character criteria. The 
original Act had thirty-four cosponsors, which grew to sixty-two when it 
was reintroduced a month later with a lower age cutoff as the “Student 
Adjustment Act of 2001.” H.R. 1918. Having never made it to law on its 
own, supporters attempted to push its major components into other bills, 
including the “Comprehensive Immigration Reform Acts” of 2006 and 
2007 (S. 2611 and S. 1348) as well as amendments to bills not exclusively 
dedicated to comprehensive immigration reform, like the “Department of 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008” (S. 1548), the latter by 
virtue of the Senate Majority Whip, Dick Durbin. In a further attempt to 
include it, Durbin removed controversial language related to in-state 
tuition, capped the qualification age at thirty and provided citizenship 
benefits to members of the military, all to no avail. Even months later 
with Republican cosponsors Hagel and Luther, Durbin would be unable 
to push the DREAM Act over procedural hurdles in the face of primarily 
Republican opposition and claims of amnesty. Elisha Barron, Recent 
Development: The Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors 
(DREAM) Act, 48 Harv. J. on Legis. 623, 633 (2011). 
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In 2009 and early 2010, Obama frequently promoted immigration 
reform in speeches, including his State of the Union address, and had 
Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano begin drafting a 
framework for immigration reform. Meanwhile, while the DREAM Act 
stalled, the 111th Congress continued to pursue immigration reform 
through a new vehicle, S. 3827, a considerably stricter version of the 
earlier act with heightened qualifications for resident status. Lending 
momentum to the cause, Senators Charles Schumer and Lindsay 
Graham publicly announced a bipartisan immigration reform proposal, 
which Obama called “‘a very important first step.’”67 Along with the 
repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”, the immigration act was included in 
the National Defense Authorization Act of 2011 but did not overcome 
a Senate filibuster in the lead up to the 2010 midterm elections. In the 
lame duck session, Obama, the Congressional Hispanic Caucus (CHC), 
and top Democrats agreed to attempt a final push for reform via a new 
introduction of the DREAM Act in the House.68 Despite passing the 
House, the bill failed to attract unanimous support from all fifty-nine 
Democrats, and the measure failed in the Senate.69 In May 2011, Senate 
Majority Leader Reid reintroduced the Act less than twenty-four hours 
after Obama’s call for Congress to take action on the issue, but it died 
in committee.  
Blocked legislatively, President Obama acted unilaterally. On June 
15, 2012, the administration announced the Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals program, or DACA. Implemented by Janet 
Napolitano, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, it 
directs the various immigration enforcement agencies to exercise 
prosecutorial discretion toward some immigrant populations that reside 
in the country illegally. While not a legislative action, and thus not able 
to change citizenship status, it grants eligible youth a work permit and 
two-year reprieve from deportation.70  
Plainly DACA shows that presidents can gain tremendous influence 
over policy by acting unilaterally. However, it also raises important 
questions, including why Obama waited so long to use his executive 
power and why he did not pursue an even bolder action moving  
67. Pleva, supra note 65. 
68. Amanda Terkel, Obama and Top Congressional Democrats Call for 
DREAM Act’s Passage Before Year’s End, Huffington Post (May 25, 
2011, 6:15 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/16/obama 
-congressional-democrats-dream-act-lame-duck-passage_n_784476.html. 
69. Karoun Demirjian, Harry Reid Reintroduces the DREAM Act, Las 
Vegas Sun: The Policy Racket (May 11, 2011), http://www.las 
vegassun.com/news/2011/may/11/harry-reid-reintroduces-dream-act/. 
70. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv., Consideration of Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), http://www.uscis.gov/humanita 
rian/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca (last updated 
Dec. 4, 2014). 
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immigration even closer to his personal preferences? Obama has 
regularly offered two justifications for the scope and extent of his use 
of unilateral power. First, perhaps due to his background as a law 
professor, he sees limits to the extent of prosecutorial discretion rooted 
in precedent. Fully stopping all deportations would be unprecedented 
and “would be ‘difficult to defend legally.’”71 Indeed, DACA emphasizes 
family considerations of young undocumented immigrants as the 
justification for preventing only some deportations. Legal concerns are 
a fairly formal constraint on unilateral action. However, just how strong 
a constraint they really are is up for debate. For example, in 2011 
President Obama publicly stated that he did not have the power to 
implement a major change in immigration policy, such as that outlined 
in the DREAM Act, unilaterally. Obama stated that the law was clear 
“that for [him] to simply, through executive order, ignore those 
congressional mandates would not conform with [his] appropriate role 
as president.”72 Second, Obama has argued that policy is better created 
through Congress. For example, in an immigration speech in San 
Francisco in November 2013, again responding to a protester, he stated:  
If in fact I could pass all these laws without Congress, I would 
do so. But we’re also a nation of laws, that’s part of our 
tradition. The easy way out is to yell and pretend that I can 
do something by violating our laws, but what I’m proposing is 
the harder path which is to use our democratic process, to 
achieve the same goals. . . .73  
Moreover, any unilateral action on immigration would likely be 
overturned by a Republican president, and thus passing immigration 
reform as an act of Congress establishes a more permanent solution 
even in terms of actions he can institute unilaterally.  
Despite expressed concerns about the scope of his legal authority 
for independent action and a stated preference for the more sweeping 
and lasting change that can be effected through legislation, President 
Obama ultimately decided to act. What tipped the balance of his 
strategic calculations? The timing of the DACA announcement plainly 
speaks to the importance of electoral incentives. Although the 
 
71. Esther Yu-Hsi Lee, President Won’t Halt Deportations of Some Parents, 
Pressures House Republicans to Act on Reform, ThinkProgress (Sept. 
18, 2013, 1:49 PM) http://thinkprogress.org/immigration/2013/09/18/ 
2638811/obama-telemundo-deportation-parents/. 
72. Michael D. Shear, Immigration Has President Altering Stand, N.Y. 
Times, Nov. 18, 2014, at A1, A15. 
73. Esther Yu-Hsi Lee, Why Obama Told a Protestor He Doesn’t Have the 
Power to Stop All Deportations, ThinkProgress (Nov. 25, 2013), 
http://thinkprogress.org/immigration/2013/11/25/2992151/obama-tells-
activist-stop-deportation/. 
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legislative history above suggests that it was far from his preferred 
method, the presidential election of 2012 undoubtedly influenced his 
decision to act unilaterally in the summer. With hopes of maintaining 
the support of Latino voters, who largely support the DREAM Act (87 
percent of Latinos and 62 percent of non-Latinos74), Obama announced 
DACA less than five months before the 2012 presidential election. Polls 
taken immediately after the announcement suggest that it was a wise 
political calculation in so far as 49 percent of Latino voters were more 
enthusiastic about Obama as a result.75 In addition, supporters of the 
DREAM Act, like Representative Gutierrez, who had become an 
outspoken critic of the administration’s inability to reform immigration 
policy, called it a “tremendous first step,” while Senator Durbin called 
it a “historic humanitarian moment.”76 The presumptive Republican 
nominee, Mitt Romney, on the other hand, argued during the campaign 
that the undocumented should commit to “self-deportation”77 and 
stated that if he were to win the election and Congress pass the 
DREAM Act, he would veto it.78 Polls unsurprisingly found that 59 
percent of Latino voters were less enthusiastic about the self-
deportation comment.79  
In sum, Obama resisted the temptation to simply implement most 
of the DREAM Act unilaterally throughout much of his first term. This 
decision appears a function of legal concerns, a preference for legislative 
 
74. Matt Barreto, New LD Poll Finds Latinos Favor Obama over Romney, 
Oppose Rubio DREAM, Latino Decisions (June 8, 2012), http://www. 
latinodecisions.com/blog/2012/06/08/new-ld-poll-finds-latinos-favor-oba 
ma-over-romney-oppose-rubio-dream/. 
75. Matt Barreto, New Poll: Latino Voters in Battle Ground States 
Enthusiastic About Obama DREAM Announcement, Oppose Romney 
“Self-deport” Alternative, Latino Decisions (June 17, 2012), http:// 
www.latinodecisions.com/blog/2012/06/17/new-poll-latino-voters-enthus 
iastic-about-obama-dream-announcement-oppose-romney-policy-of-self-
deport/. 
76. Elise Foley, Obama Administration to Stop Deporting Younger Undocu-
mented Immigrants and Grant Work Permits, Huffington Post (June 
15, 2012, 5:28 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/15/obama 
-immigration-order-deportation-dream-act_n_1599658.html. 
77. “Self Deportation”: Exploring Mitt Romney’s Odd New Phrase (VIDEO), 
Huffington Post (Mar. 25, 2012, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffing 
tonpost.com/2012/01/24/self-deportation-romney_n_1228296.html. 
78. Elise Foley, Mitt Romney Says Immigration “Dream Act” Would Get 
Veto From Him, Huffington Post (Jan. 2, 2012, 9:03 AM), http:// 
www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/31/mitt-romney-immigration-dream-
act-veto_n_1178060.html. 
79  New Five State Latino Battle Ground Pool Highlights Democrats’ Lead, 
Growing Voter, America’s Voice (June 2012), http://americasvoice. 
org/polls/new-five-state-latino-battleground-poll-highlights-democrats-
lead-growing-voter-enthusiasm-2/.  
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action, and, perhaps most importantly, broader fears about the political 
costs such an action—a clear affront to a Congress that had refused to 
enact the DREAM Act legislatively—could entail, costs that might 
hinder the administration’s prospects of securing other major items on 
its legislative and programmatic agendas. Indeed, many Republicans 
greeted the announcement of DACA with charges of unprecedented 
executive overreach.80 Ultimately, however, President Obama decided 
to act unilaterally, not simply because he correctly deduced that 
Congress would be unable to overturn his action legislatively, but also 
because the electoral benefits of acting now outweighed the anticipated 
political costs of doing so. 
However, the 2012 DACA order did not end the administration’s 
unilateral moves in immigration policy. Almost immediately following 
President Obama’s reelection victory, immigration advocates renewed 
their call for more far-reaching reform. With the prospects for legisla-
tion bleak in a Republican-controlled Congress, these advocates de-
manded additional unilateral presidential action. President Obama 
himself publicly expressed doubts about the legality of such a move. 
For example, in a 2013 interview on Telemundo, Obama declared that 
while he was proud of his earlier action to protect “Dreamers,” pursuing 
more sweeping change unilaterally would rest on far weaker legal 
foundations: “If we start broadening that, then essentially, I’ll be 
ignoring the law in a way that I think would be very difficult to defend 
legally . . . so that’s not an option.”81 
Despite these public statements questioning his legal authority to 
liberalize immigration enforcement further, by early 2014 the Obama 
administration signaled that further unilateral action on immigration 
was imminent. And yet, in the summer of 2014, the administration 
executed an about-face and delayed any final decision on new action in 
immigration policy. Electoral incentives are again key to understanding 
the administration’s strategic calculus. Executive action on 
immigration so close to the election was seen as potentially damaging 
to red state Democrats, on whom the party’s prospects for retaining 
control of the Senate depended.82 The salience of such concerns 
 
80. Foley, supra note 76. 
81. Shear, supra note 72. Many legal experts, however, do not share Obama’s 
concerns about the legality of such an action. See, e.g., Peter Shane, How 
Obama’s Immigration “Executive Action” Respects the Rule of Law, 
Washington Monthly: Ten Miles Square Blog (Dec. 1, 2014, 9:00 
AM), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/ten-miles-square/2014/12/ 
how_obamas_immigration_executi053118.php. 
82. David Nakamura & Ed O’Keefe, Obama Delays Executive Immigration 
Action Until After Midterm Elections in November, Wash. Post (Sept. 
6, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-delays-execu 
tive-immigration-action-until-after-midterm-elections-in-november/2014/ 
09/06/e3ecf346-35cf-11e4-9e92-0899b306bbea_story.html. 
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increased further still when migrant children were found illegally cross-
ing the border from Mexico into the U.S. in such a large number that 
Obama called it a “‘humanitarian crisis.’” According to the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, about 52,000 unaccompanied chil-
dren were apprehended between October 2013 and September 2014, 
with the largest numbers coming from Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, 
and El Salvador.83 Obama therefore postponed action until after the 
midterms.84 Ultimately, however, the delay failed to pay political 
dividends. Former President Clinton’s post-election comments are illu-
strative of the pickle Obama found himself in. Speaking of the 
Democratic Party, he said that “we had a little bit of a loss of the 
Hispanic vote perhaps because the president [did not provide another 
executive order on immigration].”85 “It was a tough call for him because 
had he [signed another executive memorandum on immigration], a lot 
of others would have lost by even more.”86 
Weeks after suffering his second consecutive midterm loss, 
President Obama unilaterally ordered a new deferred action program 
to shield up to another five million illegal aliens from the threat of 
deportation.87 In so doing, Obama rejected his own publicly expressed 
fears about legal constraints on his unilateral authority in the immigra-
tion sphere. Indeed, the greatest constraints on the president’s actions 
appear to have been political. In summer 2014, unilateral action on 
immigration endangered his party’s hold on the Senate, and Obama 
deferred a final decision accordingly—not because Congress would 
overturn his action, but because acting unilaterally promised to be 
politically costly. By December, other political risks remained. Indeed, 
after the midterms Washington was abuzz with speculation as to how 
congressional Republicans would retaliate against Obama should he act 
unilaterally on immigration, with many warning of another budget 
shutdown. A veteran of a previous shutdown, former House Speaker 
 
83. Why Are So Many Children Trying to Cross the U.S. Border?, BBC 
(Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-28203923. 
84. Thomas Sparrow, Can Obama Pass U.S. Immigration Reform?, BBC 
(Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-29890300. 
85. Interview by Mike Allen with Bill Clinton, Former U.S. President (Nov. 
15, 2014), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/11/clinton-no-obama-im 
migration-action-may-have-hurt-in-midterms-112924.html#ixzz3JGuhwrjD.  
86. Maggie Haberman, Clinton: No Obama Immigration Action May Have 
Hurt in Midterms, Politico (Nov. 16, 2014), http://www.politico.com/ 
story/2014/11/clinton-no-obama-immigration-action-may-have-hurt-in-
midterms-112924.html#ixzz3JGuhwrjD. 
87. Michael D. Shear & Robert Pear, Obama’s Plan Could Shield Four 
Million, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 2014, at A1; Barack Obama, Address to 
the Nation on Immigration Reform (Nov. 20, 2014) (transcript available 
at The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb. 
edu/ws/index.php?pid=107923&st=&st1 =). 
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Newt Gingrich, warned Obama against acting unilaterally, calling the 
resulting war it would initiate with Congress one that the president 
could not win.88  
However, the Republican landslide in the midterm, paradoxically, 
may have reduced the political costs of acting unilaterally. With 
Congress hopelessly gridlocked, President Obama may rationally have 
calculated that the prospects for movement on other legislative 
priorities were so bleak that they were unlikely to be damaged further 
by acting unilaterally on immigration and moving policy away from 
congressional preferences and toward his own. The contemporary 
environment—legislative gridlock on Capitol Hill and a term-limited 
president insulated from electoral concerns—may indeed create the 
most favorable conditions for robust unilateral action. Yet even in this 
case where President Obama did achieve significant influence over 
policy by acting unilaterally, it is important to reiterate that President 
Obama did not simply move policy as far left as he could while still 
ensuring that congressional Democrats could sustain a veto of any effort 
to overturn his action. Rather, Obama’s unilateral actions in 
immigration were products of strategic calculations in which political 
constraints affected both the timing and scope of the resulting executive 
actions. 
IV. Case Study: Obama and the Syrian Civil War 
At first blush, military policy may seem a surprising policy venue 
in which to look for evidence of informal political constraints on 
unilateral presidential action. After all, a mountain of scholarship has 
documented the increase in presidential war power over time, with a 
particular emphasis on President Truman’s decision not to seek 
congressional authorization for the Korean War.89 Virtually every pres-
ident since has cited Truman’s action as a precedent establishing that 
presidents possess the requisite constitutional authority under Article 
II to order American military forces abroad to pursue a variety of 
foreign policy goals independent of any congressional authorization. 
This new state of affairs is tacitly acknowledged in the War Powers 
Resolution of 1973, which sought to create a mechanism by which 
Congress could terminate presidential military ventures aside from the 
unwieldy and politically all but impossible proposition of cutting off 
 
88. Newt Gingrich, Gingrich: Obama, You Won’t Win a War with Congress, 
CNN (Nov. 13, 2014), http://edition.cnn.com/2014/11/12/opinion/ 
gingrich-obama-congress-confrontation/. 
89. See generally Schlesinger, supra note 36; Gordon Silverstein, 
Imbalance of Powers: Constitutional Interpretation and the 
Making of American Foreign Policy (1997); Stephen M. Griffin, 
Long Wars and the Constitution (2013). 
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funds for the troops in the field. For decades, the decision to use force 
has been made by the president alone.90  
Yet, while Congress has largely ceded the authority to and 
responsibility for initiating military action to the executive, it has 
repeatedly exploited opportunities to chastise the administration and 
attack its conduct of military operations that fail to unfold according 
to plan. While members of Congress may rationally prefer to be silent 
in the lead-up to a use of force, once military action begins, members 
of Congress have used an array of tools at their disposal to inflict 
political damage on the commander in chief and, indirectly, to influence 
the course of foreign policy. Since the conclusion of World War II, 
members of Congress have introduced dozens of legislative instruments 
that would in some way hamstring the president’s flexibility in the 
military arena, from efforts to cut off funding for military operations to 
those that would establish timetables for the withdrawal of American 
forces. Between 1945 and 2004, congressional committees held hundreds 
of days of hearings alleging presidential misconduct of military actions 
ranging from the Korean War to the Black Hawk down incident and 
the Battle of Mogadishu in Somalia to peacekeeping missions in the 
Balkans and the war in Iraq. More informally, members of Congress 
have taken their criticisms to the airwaves and generated considerable 
media coverage sharply criticizing administration policies.91 Although 
this opposition has largely failed to legally compel the president to 
abandon his preferred policy course, a wealth of empirical evidence 
suggests that congressional challenges—and the anticipation of them 
and the political costs they generate—has materially affected 
presidential decisions over the initiation, scale, and duration of major 
military actions since World War II.92 To illustrate the constraints on 
presidential unilateral power as commander in chief, we conclude by 
 
90. Moreover, once American troops are in theater, on only the rarest of 
occasions has Congress succeeded in legislatively compelling the president 
to alter his preferred military policy course. For a discussion of the most 
important exceptions, including legislation cutting off funds for Nixon’s 
expansion of the Vietnam War into Cambodia, the Tunney and Clark 
amendments barring U.S. assistance to paramilitary forces in Angola, the 
Boland Amendment barring Contra aid, and legislation limiting American 
military action in Rwanda, see Douglas L. Kriner, After the 
Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War 
39–41 (2010). 
91. Id. at 152–66. 
92. See William G. Howell & Jon C. Pevehouse, While Dangers 
Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers 
(2007); David H. Clark, Agreeing to Disagree: Domestic Institutional 
Congruence and U.S. Dispute Behavior, 53 Pol. Res. Q. 375 (2000); 
Kriner, supra note 90; Kevin H. Wang, Presidential Responses to 
Foreign Policy Crises: Rational Choice and Domestic Politics, 40 J. 
Conflict Resol. 68 (1996).  
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briefly examining how domestic political considerations influenced 
President Obama’s military policy decision-making when choosing how 
to respond to the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime in Syria. 
After spending the first two years focusing on drawing down 
America’s military commitment in the Middle East (while ramping it 
up in Central Asia), events and the eruption of political unrest across 
much of the region presented the Obama administration with a host of 
new policy challenges and calls for military action. On December 17, 
2010, a Tunisian street vendor set himself on fire to protest abuses by 
the police forces of Tunisian dictator Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. The 
shocking act triggered a wave of protests that culminated in the collapse 
of the Ben Ali regime in January 2011. The dramatic fall of the 
Tunisian dictator kindled pro-democracy movements across much of 
the Arab world, including serious threats to autocratic rule in Egypt, 
Libya, and Syria.93 That same month, anti-Mubarak demonstrators 
flooded Cairo’s Tahrir Square. After eighteen days of clashes, the 
military turned on Mubarak, and Egypt’s defiant pharaoh stepped 
down.94  
By February, the Arab spring had spread to Libya as demonstrators 
protested against the more than forty-year reign of Moammar Gadhafi. 
A rebel army from Benghazi headed west across the desert and by 
March threatened the capital of Tripoli itself. However, Gadhafi rallied 
his troops and turned the tide on the rebels, driving them back to their 
eastern stronghold. On March 17, Gadhafi issued a chilling warning to 
the rebels in Behghazi: “The moment of truth has come . . . . There 
will be no mercy. Our troops will be coming to Benghazi tonight.”95 In 
a desperate effort to prevent the slaughter of innocents, the United 
Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1973, which called for a 
cessation of hostilities, authorized the establishment of a no-fly zone, 
and empowered member states to take “all necessary measures” to 
protect civilians. To enforce the resolution, a coalition of countries 
including the United States began a lengthy air campaign that included 
scores of attacks on Libyan military targets. 
That same month, demonstrations began in Syria against the 
oppressive regime of Bashar Al Assad. When the regime brutally 
cracked down on the demonstrators, more widespread conflict erupted, 
which eventually spiraled out of control into a full-fledged civil war. As  
93. For an overview, see Lisa Anderson, Demystifying the Arab Spring: 
Parsing the Differences Between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, 90 Foreign 
Aff. 2 (2011). 
94. David D. Kirkpatrick, Mubarak Out: Egypt Exults as Youth Revolt Ends 
3 Decades of Iron Grip, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 2011, at A1.  
95. Ian Black, Gaddafi Threatens Retaliation in Mediterranean as UN Passes 
Resolution, The Guardian, Mar. 17, 2011, http://www.the 
guardian.com/world/2011/mar/17/gaddafi-retaliation-mediterranean-
libya-no-fly-zone. 
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the fighting intensified in the summer of 2012, the body count also 
soared. By August 2012, the United Nations estimated that more than 
20,000 people had died, 1,600 in the month’s final week alone; more 
than a quarter million had fled into neighboring countries.96 The 
growing brutality and threat to the Assad regime raised fears that 
Assad might use chemical weapons if its position on the ground further 
deteriorated. In July, the Syrian government confirmed international 
suspicions that it possessed stockpiles of chemical weapons when it 
threatened to use chemical weapons against any foreign forces that 
might intervene on behalf of the rebels.97 That same day, President 
Obama issued a veiled warning to Assad not to use chemical weapons:  
Given the regime’s stockpiles of chemical weapons, we will 
continue to make it clear to Assad and those around him that the 
world is watching and that they will be held accountable by the 
international community and the United States should they make 
the tragic mistake of using those weapons.98  
 A month later, during an August 20, 2012, news conference, Obama 
went further and declared that the use of chemical weapons constituted 
a “red line” for the United States: 
But the point that you made about chemical and biological 
weapons is critical. That’s an issue that doesn’t just concern 
Syria, it concerns our close allies in the region, including Israel. 
It concerns us. We cannot have a situation where chemical or 
biological weapons are falling into the hands of the wrong people. 
We have been very clear to the Asad [sic] regime, but also to 
other players on the ground, that a red line for us is we start 
seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or 
being utilized. That would change my calculus. That would 
change my equation.99 
 
96. United Nations, August Produces Worst Toll in Syria Conflict, Says UN, 
Reuters (Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/ 
09/17/syria-crisis-un-idUSL1E8KH8ZN20120917. 
97. Neil MacFarquhar & Eric Schmitt, Syria Threatens Chemical Attack on 
Foreign Force, N.Y. Times, July 23, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/07/24/world/middleeast/chemical-weapons-wont-be-used-in-rebelli 
on-syria-says.html. 
98. Barack Obama, Remarks at the Veterans of Foreign Wars National 
Convention in Reno, Nevada (July 23, 2012) (transcript available at The 
American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ 
?pid=101548). 
99. Barack Obama, The President’s News Conference (Aug. 20, 
2012) (transcript available at The American Presidency Project, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=101939). 
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In early 2013, the United States government began to receive initial 
reports that chemical weapons may have been used in an attack against 
the rebel stronghold of Homs that killed seven on December 23, 2012. 
Throughout the spring, the intelligence community gathered additional 
evidence of a series of small-scale potential chemical weapons attacks.100 
On April 25, 2013, the White House sent a formal letter to Senators 
John McCain (R-AZ) and Carl Levin (D-MI) in response to their 
concerns about the use of chemical weapons in Syria. The White House 
letter, which was widely reprinted in the American press, acknowledged 
that “[o]ur intelligence community does assess with varying degrees of 
confidence that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons on a small 
scale in Syria, specifically the chemical agent sarin.” However, wary of 
repeating the Bush administration’s mistakes in prewar intelligence 
regarding Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction, the Obama 
administration emphasized the need for more concrete proof: “Our 
standard of evidence must build on these intelligence assessments as we 
seek to establish credible and corroborated facts.”101  
The death toll continued to mount as fighting intensified and 
Assad’s forces gained ground in the summer of 2013. A June 2013 report 
by the United Nations Human Rights Office estimated that almost 
93,000 people had died in the Syrian war between March 2011 and April 
2013.102 Despite the human carnage, the Obama administration resisted 
calls for military intervention in Syria. This reluctance on the part of 
the administration to intervene appeared to change in August when 
unimpeachable evidence of a large-scale chemical weapons attack 
emerged. Images of the August 21 attacks, including video clips showing 
victims struggling to breathe after inhaling poisoned gas, quickly 
pervaded the media.103 Three days later, President Obama met with the 
National Security Council to consider options for an American military 
response. By all accounts, the President appeared to have decided to 
 
100. For a chronology, see Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 
2012–2014, Arms Control Ass’n (Aug. 19, 2014), http://www.arms 
control.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity. 
101. White House Letter on Syria Chemical Weapons to Senators, Associated 
Press, Apr. 25, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/25/ 
white-house-letter-syria-senators_n_3156099.html. 
102. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Updated UN Study 
Indicates at Least 93,000 People Killed in Syria Conflict (June 13, 2013), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx 
?NewsID=13447&LangID=E#3. 
103. For news coverage, including video footage of the attacks, see Loveday 
Morris & Karen DeYoung, Syrian Activists Accuse Government of Deadly 
Chemical Attack Near Damascus, Wash. Post (Aug. 22, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/syrian-activists-accuse-govern 
ment-of-deadly-chemical-attack-near-damascus/2013/08/21/aea157e6-0a 
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order unilaterally a limited series of military strikes against the Assad 
regime for its use of chemical weapons.104 Setting the stage for a military 
strike, on August 30, the White House released an official assessment 
concluding that the Assad regime had indeed used chemical weapons in 
the August 21 attack that killed 1,429 people, including at least 426 
children.105 
As a result, when President Obama strode into the Rose Garden 
on August 31, 2013, his words took many by surprise. The president 
began predictably enough by informing the American people that he 
had decided the United States should take military action to punish the 
Assad regime for its use of chemical weapons. However, what Obama 
said next caught even many administration officials off guard: 
But having made my decision as Commander-in-Chief based on 
what I am convinced is our national security interests, I’m also 
mindful that I’m the President of the world’s oldest constitutional 
democracy. I’ve long believed that our power is rooted not just in 
our military might, but in our example as a government of the 
people, by the people, and for the people. And that’s why I’ve 
made a second decision: I will seek authorization for the use of 
force from the American people’s representatives in Congress.106 
The reversal stunned most political and legal observers.107 Only two 
days prior, Secretary of State John Kerry had denounced Assad as “a 
‘thug and a murderer,’” leaving little doubt in the minds of most that 
 
104. See Adam Entous & Carol L. Lee, At the Last Minute, Obama Alone 
Made Call to Seek Congressional Approval, Wall St. J., Sept. 1, 2013, 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732400930457904754246
6837078.  
105. Press Release, The White House, Government Assessment of the Syrian 
Government’s Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013 (Aug. 30, 
2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08 
/30/government-assessment-syrian-government-s-use-chemical-weapons-
august-21. 
106. Barack Obama, Remarks on the Situation in Syria (Aug. 31, 2013) 
(transcript available at The American Presidency Project, http:// 
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=104044&st=Syria&st1=). 
107. For example, in a Lawfare blog post, Jack Goldsmith wrote, “I have been 
hard on the President—on this blog last week, and today in the NYT—
for what just about everyone (except Philip Bobbitt) thought was going 
to be his strike in Syria without congressional authorization. I was thus 
surprised, but very happily surprised, when the President announced this 
afternoon that he would seek congressional authorization for the strike.” 
Jack Goldsmith, Congratulations President Obama, Lawfare (Aug. 31, 
2013), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/08/congratulations-president-
obama/. 
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an American military response was in the offing.108 However, in the 
twenty-four hours preceding the Rose Garden address, Obama had 
changed his mind.109 
President Obama did not reverse course because he believed a 
unilateral strike would be unconstitutional. In 2011, the Office of Legal 
Counsel provided the administration with a sweeping opinion that the 
president possessed independent constitutional authority to intervene 
militarily in Libya without congressional approval because the mission 
was tied to the national interest, even if the crisis in Libya plainly did 
not involve an actual or imminent threat to the United States itself.110 
Administration lawyers reached similar conclusions in the case of Syria; 
because the United States possessed “‘important national interests’” in 
enforcing international norms against the use of chemical weapons and 
in bringing stability to Syria, the president had the constitutional 
authority to act independently of Congress.111 Indeed, in the Rose 
Garden address itself, Obama, like post-1945 presidents seeking 
congressional authorization before him, emphasized that he possessed 
the requisite constitutional authority to act unilaterally absent any 
congressional approval. His reasons for going to Congress were political, 
not constitutional: “[W]hile I believe I have the authority to carry out 
this military action without specific congressional authorization, I know 
that the country will be stronger if we take this course, and our actions 
will be even more effective.”112 
Most journalistic accounts have argued that Obama’s eleventh-hour 
reversal was the product of concerns, both at home and abroad, about 
the legitimacy of a unilateral military strike. Unlike military action in 
Libya, which was authorized by a United Nations Security Council 
Resolution, or the Clinton-era peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, which 
operated under the aegis of a united NATO, military action in Syria 
rested on a murkier international legal footing. Moreover, the United 
States would act almost alone. France continued to stand with the 
United States, but even the United Kingdom had decided not to join 
an American-led military action following Prime Minister David 
Cameron’s shocking defeat in Parliament.  
This emphasis on legitimacy is likely correct; however, it is also 
imprecise. It is important to remember that Obama faced almost no 
risk that a unilateral strike in Syria would be seriously challenged in  
108. Mark Memmott, Kerry Says Assad, A “Thug and a Murderer,” Was 
Behind Attack, NPR (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/the 
two-way/2013/08/30/217211589/coming-up-kerry-statement-about-the-
crisis-in-syria. 
109. Entous & Lee, supra note 104. 
110. Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 2 (2011). 
111. Savage, supra note 5, at A9. 
112. Remarks on the Situation in Syria, supra note 106.  
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Congress or in the international community. Any legislation seeking to 
limit his discretion as commander in chief would almost certainly die 
in the Senate. Even if legislation passed both chambers, it would 
certainly be blocked by a presidential veto. Similarly, while the UN 
Security Council might object to a unilateral American strike, any effort 
to block American military action would be defeated by a U.S. veto.  
Presidency scholarship often argues that presidents place great 
emphasis on their legacies and the judgment of history.113 Perceptions 
of a strike’s legitimacy could conceivably affect Obama’s legacy; 
however, it is equally, if not more, likely that any vacillation in the face 
of Assad’s brazen use of chemical weapons against his own people would 
harm Obama’s legacy more than arcane debates over legalistic minutiae 
had Obama acted alone, like virtually all of his predecessors, without 
congressional sanction. Indeed, from a policy standpoint, even if limited 
military action in Syria was unlikely to topple Assad, failing to enforce 
the president’s own red line could seriously damage American 
credibility with adversaries across the globe. Policy concerns would 
appear unable to explain the president’s decision. Rather, Obama’s 
reversal is best explained as an effort to avoid the political costs of 
another unilateral military strike in the Arab world.114  
In the days leading up to Obama’s decision, a growing chorus in 
Congress was calling for the president first to seek legislative 
authorization before any use of force in Syria. As of August 29, 140 
members, including twenty-one Democrats, had signed a letter stating 
that unilateral presidential military action in Syria would violate the 
separation of powers.115 The overwhelming majority of the American 
public agreed. An NBC News poll conducted between August 28 and 
29, 2013, asked, “Do you think that President Obama should or should 
not be required to receive approval from Congress before taking military 
action in Syria?” A startling 79 percent said that the president should 
be required to seek prior approval from Congress.116  
113. See, e.g., Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics 
of Structure, 57 Law & Contemp. Probs. 1 (1994). 
114. For a fuller explication of this argument and empirical evidence of the 
tangible political benefits that congressional authorizations give presi-
dents, see Douglas L. Kriner, Obama’s Authorization Paradox: Syria and 
Congress’s Continued Relevance in Military Affairs, 44 Presidential 
Studies Q. 309 (2014). 
115. Rebecca Shabad, 140 House Members Say Obama Needs Approval from 
Congress on Syria, The Hill (Aug. 29, 2013), http://thehill.com/blogs/ 
blog-briefing-room/news/319127-55-house-members-say-obama-needs-
approval-from-congress-in-syria-strikes. 
116. Survey, Hart Research Associates/Public Opinion Strategies Study 
#13338, NBC News (Aug. 28–29, 2013), available at http://msnbc 
media.msn.com/i//MSNBC/Sections/A_Politics/_Today_Stories_Tea
ses/13336_NBC_Syria_Poll.pdf (accessed by searching for the URL in 
the Internet Archive Index). [USNBC.083013.R12]. It is also important to 
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The president plainly articulated the political rationale behind his 
decision to forego unilateral action in a press conference on September 
4. If the White House acts alone, “Congress will sit on the sidelines, 
snipe. If it works, the sniping will be a little less; if it doesn’t, a little 
more.”117 Legislation constraining his freedom of action was not what 
the president feared. Rather, public criticism of his policies, particularly 
if they should prove to be more costly or less immediately successful 
than expected, is what the president hoped to avoid. Thus, Obama’s 
abrupt about-face had little to do with constitutional concerns or even 
fears of successful legislative challenges from an increasingly restive 
Congress that might compel him to amend his policy toward Syria.118 
Rather, President Obama hoped that by compelling members of 
Congress to vote to authorize military action against Syria, he could tie 
members to the mission politically and thereby minimize the political 
costs downstream.119 Anticipations of future political costs and the 
likely reactions of Congress and the public produced a dramatic policy 
shift, even though President Obama knew well that if he had acted 
unilaterally, other governmental actors would have been all but 
powerless to stop him formally. 
Conclusion  
Recent presidents have boldly acted unilaterally to effect major 
changes in public policy on issues ranging from the prosecution of the 
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war on terror to overhauling the nation’s immigration system. These 
seemingly brazen assertions of unilateral presidential power are fre-
quently decried as evidence of presidential aggrandizement that threat-
ens to upset the delicate balance of power between the branches 
carefully erected by the Framers.  
It is little wonder that contemporary presidents have increasingly 
turned to unilateral measures to pursue their policy objectives. As the 
dominant paradigm in the literature clearly articulates, presidents 
enjoy significant institutional advantages vis-à-vis the legislature when 
acting unilaterally. By acting first, presidents seize the initiative and 
force other political actors to overcome their own institutional barriers 
to overturn policy changes effected by the executive with the stroke of 
a pen. Given the collective action dilemma that hinders congressional 
efforts at institutional self-defense, a legislative process riddled with 
transaction costs, and the looming threat of a presidential veto, 
Congress has always faced long odds when endeavoring to undo a 
presidential unilateral action through legislation. In a highly polarized 
polity, in all but the rarest of circumstances Congress would appear all 
but incapable of doing so. 
However, to focus exclusively on the legislative remedy is to 
overlook the more informal pathways through which other political 
actors can retain some measure of constraint on the unilateral executive 
by affecting the political costs the president stands to bear from acting 
unilaterally. Presidents do more than simply calculate how far they can 
move policy toward their ideal point while insuring that their veto can 
be sustained. Rather, presidents also consider the political costs of 
acting unilaterally and weigh them against the benefits of doing so. 
Paying greater attention to these political constraints on unilateral 
action affords a more accurate picture of the place of the unilateral 
presidency within our separation of powers system in the contemporary 
era. Moreover, an emphasis on political costs helps explain why 
presidents routinely forego unilateral action across a range of policy 
areas, even when Congress and the courts would be highly unlikely to 
overturn their action. The political costs of “victory”—not the 
possibility of a formal legislative or judicial reversal—are perhaps the 
most significant constraints on the unilateral president. 
